

The 39th George Ernest Morrison Lecture in Ethnology 1978

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IN MODERN CHINESE THOUGHT**

MARK ELVIN

THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY  
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
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**The Thirty-ninth  
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## SELF-LIBERATION AND SELF-IMMOLATION IN MODERN CHINESE THOUGHT

Many Chinese thinkers in the first half of the twentieth century present a paradox. They begin with a search for the liberation of the self. Again and again they end with the desire for the extinction of the self: for its absorption into a collective consciousness, the homogenization of its individuality, its perpetuation as a fragment of a greater Social Self, or its assimilation into the flow of a progressing human history. In the few minutes that we have together, I would like to set before you the outlines of this paradox, aware of my own deficiencies — being by profession an economic historian — in matters of philosophy, but persuaded that it is a subject worth struggling with, for it goes to the heart of the modern Chinese feeling for life.

The links of our paradox with tradition are evident. It is appropriate to recall, in this connection, Professor Tu Wei-ming's characterization of older neo-Confucian values. "Society," he says, "is in essence an extended self. The internalization of social values . . . can . . . be interpreted as a creative step taken by the self to enter into human-relatedness for the sake of . . . its own realization."<sup>1</sup> "Man," he says elsewhere, "is a moral being who through self-effort extends his human sensitivity to all the beings of the universe so as to realize himself in the midst of the world."<sup>2</sup> What is new in the thinkers we are to discuss is often their attempt, in ways that vary, to give these old notions both a more precise definition and a more extended application, emancipated from the particularities of Chinese culture.

Let us begin with T'an Ssu-t'ung, since he embodies the paradox more clearly than anyone else. T'an was born in 1865, and was murdered by the Empress Dowager in 1898 for his reformist activities. He sought this death more or less deliberately; and his remarks on the irrelevance of personal extinction must be read with respect, because he showed he meant what he said. His one work of importance is *A Study of Altruism*, written in 1896 and published in 1898. It would be preferable, if we had more time, to start with some of his poems, for their themes of suffering, death, and the Buddhist sense of the illusory nature of the world, reveal better than anything else the disturbing intensity of his character.<sup>3</sup> Let



us, however, plunge in *medias res* and look at his hatred of the constraints imposed on the individual by accepted values.

In the preface to the *Study of Altruism* he wrote:<sup>4</sup>

From the time I was young until I was grown up, I everywhere encountered the afflictions of the bonds and relationships [of conventional morality]. I swam deep in their bitterness. It was almost something that a living person could not endure. The burden was deadly, and yet one did not die.

In his peroration he declared that all the old bonds must be destroyed:<sup>5</sup>

First we must break through the net of profits and remuneration. Then we must break through the net of conventional scholarship. . . Then we must break through the net of having rulers. Then we must break through the net of moral norms. Then through the net of [believing in] Heaven. Then through the net of the world's religions. Last of all, we must break through the net of Buddhism.

His attack on Confucianism began with the hallowed doctrine of 'names'. By 'names' is meant what we should call 'prescriptive definitions' or, more crudely, 'labels'.

Names [he wrote] are created by men. Superiors use them to control their inferiors, so that they are obliged to accord them respect. . . Rulers use names to hobble ministers. Officials use names to keep the people on the [desired] track. Fathers use names to oppress their sons. Husbands use names to keep their wives in bondage. . . How can the slightest feelings of altruism survive in them?<sup>6</sup>

Ritual, the moralized manners that governed personal relations, was equally abhorrent. In particular, he disliked the Confucian concept of 'closeness and remoteness' that lay at the heart of the kinship system. The old moral code graded the extent of one's obligations, and the intensity of the appropriate feelings, according to the proximity of the relatives with whom one was dealing. T'an would have none of this:<sup>7</sup>

If a distinction is made between closeness and remoteness, there come into being the prescriptive definitions on which ritual is based. . . The heart is forced into that in which it takes no delight. The body is bound to do that which incommodes it.

If there is constraint, then the artificialities of precedence and deference, and of bowing and kneeling, become irksome. If there is coercion, then the ideals of utmost sincerity and searing grief become an affliction.

In the Utopia of the future said T'an, there will "be no 'fathers' and no 'sons'. How much less will there be 'rulers' and 'ministers'! None of the prescriptive definitions with which despots, those robbers of the people, have coerced and bound them will any longer exist or be applicable."<sup>8</sup> He condemned most of the philosophers of the imperial period as having been the willing tools of tyranny, who did their best to control men's minds through morality. He concluded bitterly:<sup>9</sup>

The function of a prescriptive definition is not merely to obstruct the mouth, so that people are unable to speak in a straightforward fashion. It is also to imprison their minds, so that they do not dare to think matters through. There is no better way of making the Chinese people stupid than a complexity of prescriptive definitions.

The ideals in whose name T'an Ssu-t'ung was demanding what appears, at first sight, to have been the wholesale demolition of neo-Confucian values were equality and personal freedom. This is evident from his praise of friendship:<sup>10</sup>

The least harmful to human life of the five relationships, and the most beneficial, with no trace of bitterness and a delight like that of fresh water, is friendship. . . Why is this so? First, it is equal. Second, it is free. Third, its only object is [mutual] development. To summarize what this means, it is simply that the right to personal autonomy is not lost.

In politics, the new values led him to an anarchism modified only by a hint of the old Chinese concept of an all-embracing world-order:<sup>11</sup>

In the government of the world, there should be an All-Under-Heaven, but no nation-states. . . Since everyone is free, no one should be the citizens of any particular state. If there are no states, then boundaries will dissolve, wars cease, suspicions end, distinctions between self and others vanish, and equality appear.

As far as his own country was concerned he observed that "Westerners are depressed by the stultifying effect that the three bonds [of



Confucianism] have on China. They urge that China should be governed in accordance with [the dictates of] Heaven. If Heaven is used to control men, then the way of the world will be egalitarian, and no one will lose his right to autonomy."<sup>12</sup>

The picture that I have just painted of T'an Ssu-t'ung as the champion of individual liberation is authentic but misleading. That is to say, the quotations from his work are genuine enough, but the context is missing. T'an's vision, in which everything else in his philosophy found its reason for being and its proper place, was what might be called a 'materialist mysticism'.<sup>13</sup> Some may quarrel with this phrase because of the importance that he attaches to two traditional concepts: the soul of the spirit and the soul of the body. I would still propose it to you as the best simple summary of his view of the world. Consider the following passage:<sup>14</sup>

Throughout the world of laws, the world of space, and the world of all that lives, from the vast to the microscopic, there is something that fills them all, everywhere holds them together, coordinates them, and weaves them into one. It cannot be seen, or heard, or tasted, and there is no way to give it a name, but I designate it 'the ether'. Confucius termed its manifestation in actions 'altruism', 'the primal', and 'the basic nature'. Master Mo called it 'loving without discrimination', the Buddha 'the sea of the true nature', and 'compassionate sorrow'. Jesus spoke of it as 'the spiritual soul', 'loving others like oneself', and 'regarding enemies as friends'. Scientists name it 'chemical affinity' and 'the force of attraction'. This entity is all of these. . . It is the ether that lets the eyes see, the ears hear, the nose smell, the tongue taste, and the body touch. . . If you were to split an atom down to nothing, and to observe what it is that holds it together, that would be the ether. . . The moon and the earth attract each other and do not fly apart. The eight planets, Terra with Luna, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, and Neptune, and the countless asteroids and comets, all attract each other and do not scatter. . . The starry clusters of the Milky Way, whose number is as the sands of the River Ganges, attract each other and do not scatter. . . All this attraction is what I call the ether. . . Only when scholars have clearly recognized its substance and its function may they then go

on to talk about altruism.

In T'an's view we are part of a cosmic flux of forces — forces that are, in some sense, material, mental, and moral all at the same time. He continues:<sup>15</sup>

Just as people know that the nerves carrying the forces of the brain join the five sense-organs and the skeleton into a single body, so they ought to know that electrical forces join Heaven and Earth, all creatures, others and ourselves, into a single body. . . My mind has the power to affect others, so that they share my thoughts. . . In the last analysis, there is no barrier between others and one's self, for which reason the innermost feelings are as if open to view. Scholars should also recognize clearly that electricity is the same as brain. Since electricity is present everywhere, one's self is present everywhere. When foolish divisions are made between others and one's self, altruism disappears.

Human relationships should be absorbed into friendship alone:<sup>16</sup>

According to Buddhist teaching, all alike, regardless of whether they are rulers or ministers, husbands and fathers, or wives and mothers, or sons, or elder or younger brothers, should leave the family and take vows, becoming members of the monastic community. . . There is nothing that can be called a state. It is as if all were one state. There is nothing that can be called a family. It is as if all were one family. There is nothing that can be called a body. It is as if all were one body.

He praised Jesus. Jesus, he said, had caused men to have "the power to be their own masters" but had also "smashed the selfishness of having the family and the state".<sup>17</sup>

It is at this point in T'an's philosophy that the self, after being liberated, begins to disappear again. The better to understand its extinction, however, we must leave the mysticism for a moment and look more closely at the materialism. T'an's study of Western science had taught him, that the difference between "sweet smells and stinking odours" was as he put it, no more than "a slight difference in the arrangement of the atoms". From this he concluded that it was a mistake to think of anything as having "a fixed and unchanging nature". The conservation of matter in chemical reactions also seemed to him to



prove that "existence and non-existence are concentration and dispersion. There is no creation and no destruction."<sup>18</sup>

Why then should we fear death?

To love life and to fear death [he said] may be called a great delusion and a lack of understanding. It results from being blind to non-creation and non-destruction. . . If people cannot overcome their fear of death, and are shrinking, confused, and without the courage to act, they will all the more evade their involvement with the human predicament; they will abandon themselves more and more to evil, pay unceasing attention to making a favourable impression but be ill-at-ease everywhere, and think of nothing but their own pleasure and peace of mind. How can All-Under-Heaven be brought under good government again? . . . If they think only of their lives or, as one might say, of those few decades so swiftly gone, their minds will remain fixed on eating, drinking, copulating, possessions, income, reputation, and status. . . Did Heaven give birth to men merely to furnish them with amusement and then forthwith to destroy them?<sup>19</sup>

After setting forth a theory of the chemical reincarnation of the body, in which the atoms of a corpse reassemble to "become new people and new things", he declares "how much less does the essence that is in the bodily soul pay regard to birth and destruction!" And he cites with approval the opinion of the seventeenth-century philosopher Wang Fu-chih that "when a Sage dies, his vital essence divides and becomes a multitude of men of worth."<sup>20</sup>

Tan's ethical theories are difficult to disentangle. At one point he argues that "in Heaven and Earth there is only altruism". Evil has no ultimate existence, in the sense that there are no intrinsically evil acts, but only circumstances under which a given act, like killing or copulating, may be wrong.<sup>21</sup> At another point he seems to be saying that moralizing and moral codes destroy morality, which would arise naturally if only altruism were allowed unfettered expression.<sup>22</sup> To pursue the complications that arise here would take us too far from our theme. There is no doubt, however, that his ruling passion was the idea of progress. "I know," he said, "that the movement of the world is from the bitter and towards the sweet."<sup>23</sup> Constant innovation was at the heart of life. "The greatest good," he declared, "is to be new each day. Not to

be new each day is the greatest evil.”<sup>24</sup> Those who oppose reform, he tells us, “themselves cut off the transforming potential in their own lives, an act that is utterly opposed to altruism, and end up as totally antiquated, corrupted, and soulless rubbish!”<sup>25</sup> Following the ancients was a form of suicide. Advance was not, it was true, easy. As he put it, “if the True Way rises by a foot, the impediments rise by ten. The greater the progress, the more the obstacles.”<sup>26</sup> Man’s lot was therefore perpetual struggle.

It might possibly be argued that T’an’s philosophical commitment to progress was not unequivocal, on the basis of his remark that “the past and the present are equal”;<sup>27</sup> but the tenor of his book, taken as a whole, shows a clear belief in two sorts of progress. One was the usual material variety. His attitude towards it may be seen in his enthusiasm for machinery, and for the new means of transport that had, as he said, “reduced a journey of a thousand stages to almost a foot.”<sup>28</sup> The other was spiritual progress.

A hint of what he meant by spiritual progress is given by four of the twenty-seven gnomic propositions that preface *The Study of Altruism*:<sup>29</sup>

7. The visible embodiment of intercommunication is equality.
8. If there is intercommunication then the place of honour is certain to be given to the spiritual soul. If there is equality then the physical soul may become the spiritual soul.
9. The spiritual soul belongs to the domain of enlightened discernment. The physical soul belongs to the domain of the day-to-day knowledge of the unenlightened.
10. Enlightened discernment is born from altruism.

This use of Buddhist terminology is instructive; but it is Buddhism with a difference. T’an’s goal is a *collective enlightenment*. For this, the self as such must be extinguished in the totality. Consider these strange words from his closing pages:<sup>30</sup>

The fundamental reason why others and the self cannot inter-communicate is that the ways in which the ethers of the brain move are different for each of us. Whenever I am in a state of peaceful introspection, I can see the movements of the ethers of my brain. Their colour is a pure white, their light clear and sparkling. They are as fine as silken threads, their shapes sinuous and twisting. This is how they move: they alter all the time in an undetermined way between long and short, plentiful and sparse, existent and non-



existent, with a swiftness for which no words are adequate, like flashes of lightning among the clouds, free from the least imperfection.

It is my belief that the brain is electricity. At first I thought that it moved at random. Later, I perceived that this is not so. When the multitude of thoughts is transparent, they are hidden in their tranquillity, and not visible to the eye. If, by some chance, a thought emerges, patterns of electricity appear, and thought tirelessly follows thought, their movements never ceasing. When thoughts change, the movements are likewise very different; and the more thoughts, the more differences. They accumulate in so much complexity, and so intermingled, that they no longer form patterns. One can deduce from the different movements that accompany different thoughts that the manner of the movement is determined by the thoughts, and is of a specific type. . .

The movements [of the ethers of the brain] constitute consciousness. Since the ways in which the ethers of the brain move have countless dissimilarities, and consciousness is borne along upon them, confusion arises. As every person, every place, every time, and every phenomenon is different, how can there be a means whereby others and the self can communicate? The fault lies in the mutual incompatibility, or, in other words, in consciousness. If we now seek inter-communication between them, *we must extinguish consciousness*. If we want to extinguish consciousness, we must change the way in which the ethers of our brain move. Contact with the outside must be cut off. Internally, we must return to simplicity. We must become simpler and simpler until nothingness is reached, at which point consciousness will have been destroyed. When consciousness has been destroyed the self will have been removed along with it. When the self has been removed, differences will have been annihilated. When differences have been annihilated, equality appears. When equality has been attained, every entity will be penetrated by an awareness of every other entity, with not the least barrier between them. This is the culmination of the intercommunication of self and others. . . . This is altruism!

The transformation has been effected. The call for the liberation of the individual self has become the demand for its disappearance.

T'an was widely read in the first half of the twentieth century. How far, though, did he express ideas that were characteristic of Chinese thought during this period? I think it is true to say that, while he was unusual in the ruthlessness of his conclusions, we can find the notions we have just been discussing in partial or less explicit form in modern Chinese thinkers of almost every persuasion. Even in Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei (1868–1940), who based his philosophy upon aesthetics, an echo can be heard. Professor Duiker has written, in a recent article on Ts'ai, that he "placed a premium . . . on an unfettered search for individual self-realization", but that "through self-realization, all the individual wills in the world would eventually be expanded into a common will. . . a true harmony. . . in the spiritual all-one".<sup>31</sup> I should like, therefore, to illustrate at least the plausibility of my assertion by looking briefly at four philosophers and two men of letters, all of whose important work was published between 1890 and 1950.

K'ang Yu-wei was born in 1858 and died in 1927. He was best known in his life as a political reformer, but I shall consider him today only in his capacity as the author of *The Great Uniformity*, a detailed blueprint for Utopia, first drafted in the 1880s, but not published in full until 1935, eight years after his death. When he was twenty years old, he had a vision, which he recounted as follows:<sup>32</sup>

I was sitting in a calm frame of mind when all at once I saw that Heaven and Earth and I were all the same entity. A great light shone forth. I thought I was a Sage, and laughed with delight. Suddenly I called to mind the sufferings of humanity, and I wept in my grief.

After sleepless nights of meditation, he concluded that Heaven had given him his talents in order to cure the agonies of mankind. He resolved to make his ambition "the good administration of the world."<sup>33</sup>

K'ang was, therefore, a would-be Boddhisattva who became a Benthamite. The cruelty of life haunted him. "The azure heaven and the round earth are nothing but a great slaughter-yard, a great prison."<sup>34</sup> Progress, he said, was to be able to "reduce men's pain and to increase their pleasure."<sup>35</sup> So *The Great Uniformity* is devoted to strictly utilitarian ends.



Avoidable unhappiness, thought K'ang, was due to inequalities created by nature and by man. Thus having different states caused wars, and K'ang advocated as a remedy world government and a world language. Having social classes was a violation of men's natural equality, bred bitterness, and hindered the development of the talents of those in the less privileged groups. So — no more classes. Complete physical and mental uniformity was essential to happiness. Therefore different ethnic groups had to be homogenized by means of population transfers and mixed marriages. Eventually everyone was to be of the same colour, the same shape, and the same intelligence.<sup>36</sup>

Women had suffered from the subservience they were expected to show towards men, on no better grounds than sexual differences. Except in matters relating to the bearing of children, men and women were therefore to be treated as equals; and on all formal occasions they were to wear unisex clothing.<sup>37</sup> The family was a source of small-scale collective selfishness, and was to be abolished. Children could then be brought up in institutions in identical fashion. "Otherwise," he said, "people's characters will not be of the same kind."<sup>38</sup> Men had varying dispositions and had to be "smelted and forged", a process most easily effected when they were young. Thus, he concluded, "morality may easily be unified and behaviour made identical."<sup>39</sup> The economy was to be run by the state, to prevent the re-emergence of rich and poor. But K'ang remained beset by the fear that exceptional and charismatic personalities might reappear; and he ordained that such people were to be thrown into prison.<sup>40</sup>

The wilderness was to be municipalized and homogenized. All animals harmful to man were to be exterminated. The others were to be domesticated, kept in zoos, or employed as servants. Birds would perform as choristers.<sup>41</sup> Universal economic development — the irrigation of deserts, the levelling of mountain-ranges, and the construction of artificial islands — would create a global parkland equipped with every consumer amenity, even hanging glass cages from which to admire the view.<sup>42</sup> The human spirit would, he hoped, be kept alive by modest doses of emulation between administrative units in economic output, the advancement of knowledge, and the practice of altruism.<sup>43</sup>

K'ang's views are fairly well known in the West,<sup>44</sup> and there is no need to elaborate on them further here. For our present purpose, the important thing is to note the contrast between two aspects of his thinking.



K'ang repeatedly affirms that "all men have a right to freedom conferred on them by Heaven".<sup>45</sup> In his chapter on women he denounces the bitterness that arises when someone is forced, all his or her life, to do something that he or she hates.<sup>46</sup> Yet his recipe for general happiness is the destruction of all that might make an individual individual.

When we turn to recent Chinese philosophers of a more traditional bent, we also find this pattern of the liberation of the individual self followed by its resubmergence in a greater, all-encompassing whole, though the form and context are more psychological than social. I shall take as an example Feng Yu-lan, who was born in 1895 and is still alive. His system may best be described by his own term 'neo-neo-Confucianism' (*hsin li hsueh*), though he is an eclectic who owes much to Chuang-tzu and Chuang-tzu's commentator Kuo Hsiang, and something to Plato and Hegel. Out of his several books on his own philosophy, the most relevant to our topic is his *A New Examination of Man*, published in 1943. In 1950 Feng gave his allegiance to the Communist revolution, and renounced his earlier work as erroneous. When the present tense is used in what follows, it must therefore be understood to be in accordance with the convention that ideas are, in some sense, timeless.

For Feng, man's most distinctive characteristic is conscious awareness. Personal development consists in the expansion of this conscious awareness. According to the level of his awareness, a man may live in one of four distinct spiritual realms. These are, in ascending order, the Realm of Nature, the Realm of Utility, the Realm of Morality, and the Realm of the Universal. He summarizes the psychological state that each represents as follows:<sup>47</sup>

In the realm of Nature, men do not know that there is a self . . .

In the realm of Utility, men have a self. In this realm, all a man's actions are selfish . . . In the realm of Morality, man is without self. He acts morally, for the sake of morality . . . In the realm of the Universal, man is likewise without the self, but this selflessness must be called 'the Great Selflessness'.

In his view, morality derives from man's being a member of society. Moral actions are defined as those consciously directed to seeking the happiness of others, without any thought of personal advantage therefrom. "A man," he says, "must sacrifice himself in order to seek the benefit of society."<sup>48</sup>



As awareness advances one realizes that one is not just a part of society but also of the Universe; and, to quote Feng again, "man must contribute not only to society but also to the Universe."<sup>49</sup> The enlightened man sees his own life and all phenomena as "parts of the Embodiment of the Way". The term 'Embodiment of the Way' is, he says, "a general name for all transformations", or "the Great Phenomenon that has no beginning and no end", or even "the flux of operational effects".<sup>50</sup> Such a man is not only aware that he is part of the Great Totality; he actually becomes identified with it, or identical to it. "When a man has become identified with the Great Totality," says Feng, "for him the distinction between self and non-self no longer exists."<sup>51</sup>

He then imagines a sceptic asking how a part, that is to say man, can be identified with a whole, that is to say the Universe. The answer is Mind; and he cites with approval a famous passage from the sixteenth-century philosopher Wang Yang-ming about how Intelligence pervades the Universe, so that there are no divisions between the self and other entities.<sup>52</sup> "Man's mind," Feng asserts, "may likewise be a part of the Cosmos, but the range of its thoughts is not restricted to part of the Cosmos."<sup>53</sup> To materialists who argue that the mind is no more than the movements of the brain, he retorts that the mind depends on the brain, but only in the way that a picture depends on paints and paper for its existence.<sup>54</sup> Furthermore, "when one becomes identified with the Great Totality, the self is by no means entirely extinguished." Rather, what occurs is "an unlimited expansion of the self." "In this unlimited expansion the self is in fact the ruler of the Great Totality." Finally, says Feng, "religions consider God to be the ruler of the Universe, but the man who is in the realm of the Universal is aware that his self is the ruler of the Universe. If the ruler of the Universe is God, then his self is God."<sup>55</sup>

For the man still in the realm of Utility, that world ruled by the pursuit of pleasure, income, and publicity, his life is "the continuation of the existence of the self", and his death "the destruction of its existence." For the man in the realm of Morality, death is but the conclusion of his duties and obligations. Since his acts have an exclusively social significance, personal extinction is of no deep importance. He sees himself as a link between the sages of the past and generations yet to come. For the man in the realm of the Universal, life and death are both

what Feng calls "following the transformations". In the words of Kuo Hsiang, he is "one with the Creative Force"; and so, as Kuo says of himself, "wherever I go, I encounter myself. What can be gained, what lost? Who dies, who is born?" Feng glosses this with the observation that "one who has become one with the Great Changes is aware that he himself is without beginning and without end." The self, co-identified with the Great Totality, exists across all space and all time.<sup>56</sup>

All this drama is internal. What Feng is talking about is acquiring a certain state of mind in which all one's acts, however trivial, acquire a deep cosmic meaning. The content of these acts is largely taken for granted. "The man in the realm of the Universal," he says, "has in no sense to act differently from the mass of the ordinary people."<sup>57</sup> Indeed, "it is the special characteristic of neo-Confucianism to seek the realm of the Universal in the actions of one's everyday life."<sup>58</sup> One's obligation is simply to "fulfil the duties arising from one's personal relations and one's job."<sup>59</sup> Like an actor, he says, who has been assigned a part in a play, one must accept one's role and play it to the best of one's ability.<sup>60</sup> He does not consider that one might question the casting and the script.

Feng has a curious but revealing argument that a landscape painting must always be more beautiful than a real landscape, because it contains more 'spirit'.<sup>61</sup> This epitomizes his withdrawal into the philosopher's equivalent of infantile dreams of omnipotence. The man in the realm of the Universal, he says, "has transcended the limitations of the real world." Therefore, "he is not subject to these limitations. Not to be subject to limitations is what is called freedom."<sup>62</sup> Elsewhere, Feng equates freedom with an "awareness" of Heaven; and it is only a slight oversimplification of his position to say that, for him, freedom is a matter of psychology. *Und das Schöne blüht nur im Gesang.*<sup>63</sup>

When we turn to philosophers who were more deeply influenced by the modern West, we find some slight but significant changes. The first of these is the belief in the permanently significant contribution of the individual. Hu Shih (1891-1962) wrote the following moving words about the death of his mother:<sup>64</sup>

As I reviewed the life of my dead mother, whose activities had never gone beyond the trivial details of the home but whose influence could be clearly seen on the faces of those men and



women who came to mourn her death . . . I came to the conclusion that everything is immortal. This line of reasoning led me to what may be called the religion of social immortality, because it is essentially based on the idea that the individual self which is a product of the accumulated effect of the social self, leaves an indelible mark of everything it is and everything it does upon that larger Self which may be termed Society, or Humanity, or the Greater Being . . . This Great Self lives forever as the everlasting testimony of the triumphs and failures of the numberless individual selves.

Hu distinguished this theory from the traditional idea that a select few survived through the memory of their virtues, achievements, and writings. He ascribed social imperishability to every action of every person, trivial as well as exceptional, evil as well as good. He argued that this was not "revering Society and annihilating the individual" since, though "the world of today is what it is through the accumulated virtues and sins of our predecessors, the world of the future depends entirely on the virtues and sins that we ourselves accumulate."<sup>65</sup> He concluded:<sup>66</sup>

I must say: "Of no word that I utter should I dare to forget its social influence. Of no step that I take should I dare to forget its social influence." This is my duty towards the Greater Self. If one can act like this, this is morality, this is religion.

A second novelty, prefigured by T'an Ssu-t'ung, is the worship of the future as the supreme validating principle of morality. A notable exponent of this is Chang Tung-sun, who was born in 1886 and is the most Westernized of Chinese philosophers, as at home with Aristotle, Kant, and Einstein as he is with Buddhism, his earliest philosophic passion.<sup>67</sup>

In his tract *A Fledgling Philosophy*, published in 1929, Chang describes the universe as a spatial structure, composed of "the interweaving of countless structures", that evolves through time. <sup>68</sup> The distinguishing feature of this "evolutionary process" is "an increased intercooperation throughout the entire entity". From this he argues that "if a man's life has any value, that is because man's life in the universe has a relatively . . . progressive place. If it does not, and has an insignificant place in the universe . . . then one can deduce that man's life is valueless."<sup>69</sup> Strictly

speaking, he adds, value is relative, and man's life lacks any absolute value or purpose; but in a sense one can regard its purpose as the immanent one of the self-completion of the personality.<sup>70</sup>

In his book *The Philosophy of Morals*, published in 1931, Chang says that the goal of each individual's life is to break free from the constraints of time and space, from mere immediate existence in the here and now. Culture and civilization represent a collective effort on the part of all humanity to achieve this object for its members. "I am strongly opposed," he writes, "to the idea of returning to nature."<sup>71</sup> "What is noble in man is that he can mark out an independent domain from the natural world, throughout which the laws of nature reign, in which he can put into effect laws at variance with the laws of nature."<sup>72</sup>

It is knowledge and awareness that make it possible for civilized man to participate in this process of collective self-realization. He uses the metaphor of two lamps in a dark room. "The lamps," he says, "cannot have their existence in common, but their light can." People are like lamps, irreducibly individual, but knowledge, which is "the value of life" as opposed to its mere existence, is like the light, and belongs to a shared, objective domain, that of culture.<sup>73</sup> He concludes: "The reason that I say that human life has a purpose is because there is knowledge; and it is possible for it to change a purposeless natural existence into a purposeful idealistic existence."<sup>74</sup> And the advance of knowledge is "absolutely irreversible".<sup>75</sup>

Chang's starting-point is the individual. "If," he says, "the spirit of an individual can create something that will add to the existing general stock of culture, this creation represents the forward march of culture." But he warns that if it is too individualistic it will have no value as a contribution.<sup>76</sup> In general, the "lesser self", or the "false self", can only attain any value if the sublimation of selfish desires can lead to an awareness of the "greater self", or "true self".<sup>77</sup> What is society, then? Is it a super-being in its own right, or simply an association for the benefit of individuals? Chang says he regards himself as a follower of Wundt: the social mind is more than just an agglomeration of individual minds.<sup>78</sup> The appearance of an inherited tendency to moral behaviour he explains on the sociobiological grounds of its probable survival value for the group.<sup>79</sup> He differs, he says, from what he terms "the theory of enlightenment" that desires "to transcend actuality", not in his



ultimate objective, but in his method. What it hopes to achieve suddenly and on an individual basis, he believes can only be achieved through progress and "by regarding all mankind as a single entity."<sup>80</sup>

Immortality is available to the individual only in terms of the consequences of his actions. As Chang writes in *A Fledgling Philosophy*:<sup>81</sup>

[If there is no undying soul] does that not mean that once we are dead we are finished? No. It does not. If, indeed, our universe is a complex, living structure, then every one of our actions has consequences in its remotest parts. If, indeed, this structure incorporates time, and time is not merely a straight line, then the influence of our actions not only extends far into the future, but also sends waves into the past. . . This is the theory of imperishability.

*The Philosophy of Morals* has a similar argument in different terms:<sup>82</sup>

One could say that actual existence at the point of [space-time] intersection [that is the present moment] is continually dying. . . It is not necessary to wait for the body to perish for death to come. To emancipate life somewhat from space and time is to extend its domain. . . The culture that we humans have invariably seeks to remove life from the intersection-point of space and time, and to transcend it. The higher this transcendence, the closer, we may say, to immortality. . . Existence requires knowledge precisely so that it may have a means to transcend existence. . . Since mankind came into being, all creations of the spirit. . . have been a struggle to find immortality. . . The individual seeks to extend the domain of his life so that he may exist for ever. The accumulation [of such endeavours] is culture. . . Every individual dies; but the culture that he has produced is comparatively immortal.

Or rather, immortal subject to one proviso. It is necessary to be progressive. "If," says Chang, "a person is stationary with respect to the advance of human life in the universe, and does not progress, or even goes against the current, then — even if his person and actions are known to a great number of people — he does not merit the designation imperishable."<sup>83</sup>

Here is the beginning of future-worship. An individual's life is significant only in so far as it is absorbed into what is judged to be, in some sense, a forward movement of phenomena. Intrinsic moral values

begin to fade. Acts are regarded as good or bad in so far as they speed, or hinder, the advent of a certain conception of the future — which is destined to recede perpetually. To see this in fully developed form, let us conclude by looking at two revolutionaries.

Nowhere does the tension between the desire for a total self-expression and an ecstatic self-immolation show itself so clearly as in the early writings of Kuo Mo-jo (b. 1892), which have been so admirably analyzed by Professor David Roy. Here, for example, is Kuo talking about poetry:<sup>84</sup>

Only a poem which is a pure manifestation of the poetic feelings and images in the mind, a strain flowing from the well of life, a melody played on the lute-strings of the heart, a tremor of life, a cry of the soul, can be a true poem, a good poem, a well-spring of human happiness. . . Whenever I encounter such a poem. . . I only wish I could swallow it, book, paper, and all.

Here he is on children:<sup>85</sup>

There is not a moment of the day when [a child] does not devote his entire self to the tasks of creation, expression, and enjoyment. The life of a child is the life of a genius in miniature.

Kuo wanted to become a superchild.

Little by little, however, he came to feel that self-realization was an illicit indulgence until it was equally accessible to everyone. In 1923 he declared:<sup>86</sup>

Until the economic systems of the world have been transformed, such things as the manifestations of Brahma, the dignity of the self, and the gospel of love can only be the morphine or cocaine of the propertied and leisured classes, while the members of the proletariat are left to soak themselves in sweat and blood.

And he wrote to a friend that "the literature. . . which transcends time and space. . . can only come into being after the realization of socialism."<sup>87</sup>

Personal freedom had to be renounced, in a mortification of the spirit, so that others might enjoy it later. He wrote:<sup>88</sup>



A world in which everyone will be able to develop his talents . . . , in which everyone will be able to find freedom. . . is. . . the most perfect of worlds. . . If we should not be destined to see the coming of such an era. . . in our own lifetimes — and it goes without saying that we cannot be so destined — then the only course which we, — living in this unfree age, should pursue is to devote our efforts to bringing about [its] realization. . . that our posterity may soon be free of life's material bonds.

Romanticism and revolutionary impulse fused in a cult of action:<sup>89</sup>

If all natural phenomena are manifestations of God [he wrote], and I also am a manifestation of God, then I am God, and all natural phenomena are manifestations of me. When a man has lost his Self and become one with God, he transcends time and space, and sees life and death as one. . . Energy is the source from which all things are created; it is the will of the Universe. . . If one can achieve union with this energy, one will be aware only of life and not death, only of constancy and not change. . . With the same energy with which a lion strikes its prey, with the whole body and the whole soul, one must seek self-realization in every moment.

So he became a revolutionary writer, hating the beauties of the world as an illusion, raging at songbirds that they should dare to warble in the gardens of the rich, seeing his work as the artistic equivalent of the activist's bomb.<sup>90</sup>

This pattern of revolutionary emotion does not have any exact counterpart in Chinese revolutionary theory. Let us take as an example the most systematic exposition of Chinese Communist ideology, the 1949 edition of *The Philosophy of the Masses* by Ai Ssu-ch'i (1910–1966). We do not find in its pages any commitment, however qualified, to the self-realization of the individual as such, but instead views like the following:<sup>91</sup>

We have revolutionary thoughts and actions. We exert ourselves to serve the great people. This is the main side of our character, and an aspect of the path of development of the distant future. But we also often contain the dregs of thought of petty-bourgeois individualism, and even the dregs of the consciousness of the

other exploiting classes. We often make calculations for our own private profit, which prevents us from serving the people with whole heart and whole will. This is the reverse side of our character, the rotten side that must be smashed.

Independence of thought or perception is illusory. Thought has a class character. There are no purely rational grounds for deciding the validity of an argument. What proves an idea erroneous is its defeat in practice. Any failure on the part of a revolutionary tends to indicate that his mind is not reflecting reality properly, since knowledge is a reflection of the material world that lies about us. Only the minds of those who have a working-class standpoint can reflect reality unimpaired by selfishness. So, Ai says (and this really is what he says):<sup>92</sup>

If you are resolved to become a very good camera, and able to have an accurate knowledge of everything, then you must first resolve a basic question, namely, you must take the standpoint of the workers and the broad mass of the people. On what basis can you be reckoned to have taken the standpoint of the broad mass of the people? You must be able to make yourself wholeheartedly, wholemindedly loyal to the interests of the people, that is, you must resolve that all your work, and all your ability, shall be used for the task of liberating the broad mass of the people; and that you will sacrifice all, without begrudging it, to the achievement of this goal. . . If you are able to be like this, without the slightest individual selfishness, and in no degree affected by the influence on thought of the selfishness and vileness of the large landlord or large bourgeois classes, then, when you examine a question, you will have no prejudices, no anxieties, to impede your understanding the true nature of the question to the bottom, then you can obtain a correct knowledge of everything.

There is a link here with Feng Yu-lan's views, which may be expressed as follows: only by taking a working-class standpoint and so escaping from the selfishness of the realm of bourgeois Utility can the mind gain the understanding of the laws that give it both freedom and power. For according to Ai:<sup>93</sup>



If we have not the slightest knowledge of the laws of development of society, then our actions are entirely conditioned by our own class interests. . . *Per contra*, if we know the laws of development of society. . . we can escape from blindness and consciously tread the road of inevitable victory.

What is more, "if a man's thinking can be in accord with the laws of reality, and if he can know these laws in appropriate fashion, then he can wield very great strength, and make use of the knowledge of these laws to change the reality of the world."<sup>94</sup> In short, "he can control the world."<sup>95</sup>

But reality is always changing. According to Ai:<sup>96</sup>

Everything in this world contains mutually opposed aspects. These mutually opposed aspects are constantly conflicting and struggling. . . The changes in things, their development, are all the outcome of struggles between their opposing aspects.

So the truth in the revolutionary's mind, which is a reflection of reality, though interpreted by theoretical constructs, must always be changing too.<sup>97</sup> "Truth is relative," Ai argues. "It is true only under certain objective circumstances. When objective circumstances have changed, the way in which we look at truth must also change."<sup>98</sup> Dialectical materialism is required because it is "a method capable of [handling] change", so that the method of thought of the person who uses it will "conform" with the laws of phenomena, which are also changing.<sup>99</sup> Of course, he adds, yesterday's outdated views are not simply false. Absolute truth is gradually being approached as the limit of the sum of partial, relative truths.<sup>100</sup>

This is Ai's Hegelian-Marxian-Leninist vision: with an everchanging reality and an everchanging theory perfectly attuned and interacting, the selfless yet in a sense omnipotent revolutionary becomes one with the simultaneous forward march of progress and truth. *The Philosophy of the Masses* opens a vista before us:<sup>101</sup>

Once we have a knowledge of these laws, we can have a foresighted understanding of the trend of future developments. . . We can guide our actions in accordance with these predictions, and cause our actions to be without error, cause ourselves to be able to walk on the road of growth, and not on the road of destruction.

We have reached the end of the survey I promised; and it would seem appropriate to draw together some conclusions. Yet I hesitate to do so. Looking at thinkers in the highly selective fashion that I have adopted inevitably distorts the overall balance and arrangement of their ideas. Emphasis has been laid on the common fascination felt by our subjects for the absorption of the self into a greater totality or process, and the measure of covert psychological self-aggrandizement sometimes contained therein. A different approach, a different selection of topics, might easily suggest that the differences were of more weight than the similarities. Nor am I confident that there is any clear trend from 1890 to 1950. At one time I should have been tempted to argue for an increasing philosophic concern with the practical, and pointed to the shift of thought apparent in Chang Tung-sun's *Democracy and Socialism* of 1948 as the kind of evidence on which such a case might be built. Yet, as Professor Wakeman has pointed out, K'ang Yu-wei was philosophically concerned with practicability and developed a doctrine of relativistic ethics in consequence.<sup>102</sup> At a more superficial level, of course, there was an immense increase in Chinese knowledge of the Western philosophic tradition;<sup>103</sup> but the interesting and more difficult question is, What was being done with that knowledge? Here the evidence presented tonight suggests that, in many respects, it was being pressed into the service of recognizably traditional goals. It is still? Here hesitation must become refusal. Least of all do I see deeply enough to wish to guess for you what the great river of Chinese philosophy, which has now flowed underground these thirty years, will be like when it comes up into the sunlight again as, eventually, it must.



## NOTES

I should like to thank Professor Wang Gungwu for his generous help in improving some of the translations from T'an Ssu-t'ung's *Jen hsueh*, and Professor D.T. Roy and Harvard University Press for kind permission to quote passages from *Kuo Mo-jo: The Early Years* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).

<sup>1</sup> W.M. Tu, "Li as a process of humanization," *Philosophy East and West* XXII.ii (April 1972), 195.

<sup>2</sup> W.M. Tu, "The Neo-Confucian concept of man," *Philosophy East and West* XXI.i (Jan 1971), 86.

<sup>3</sup> "The Boy who Hauled the Boat", which celebrates the stoicism of a ten-year-old, is no literary masterpiece but an eloquent example of the kind of action that touched T'an to the quick:

Wind from the north  
Gust after gust,  
Mounting swell  
Thunder-throated,  
A mere boy dragging  
The long tow into the wind.  
  
The long tow to the boat of people  
Where fear shivers,  
For living or dying  
Lie in the boy's hands.  
  
Dragged from his feet  
He rises, and falls  
Dragged from his feet  
Again and again,  
But his grip grows tighter  
Though the cords bite flesh from his palms.  
  
The bones start through  
Yet he keeps his silence.

Hands that are bones  
Lest other bones  
Lie in the river's depths.

*T'an Ssu-t'ung ch'uan chi* (Peking: San-lien, 1954), 461. His presentiment of his own death is expressed in "Getting Up when Sick":

I'd been unwell some time, lying in my cheerless  
study,  
When a cricket cried, half-mute with cold.  
I got up, listened, and stood for a long while  
At the top of the deserted steps.  
I could make out the edge of the wood in the dusk  
And the lift of the hills that met the setting sun,  
One bird coming down, a drift of smoke,  
And an autumn drizzle good for the garden thickets.  
I leaned on my old man's staff,  
Troubled by how the rivulets vanished.

*Ibid.*, 465-5. A restlessness possessed him, as is evident from the concluding lines of "Night Anchorage":

An unclear moon and hills asleep,  
Chill frost, the current stopped,  
And a remote stillness all around —  
I, I alone, what am I searching for?

*Ibid.*, 467. The extent of his immersion in Buddhist thought, and his sense of the impermanence of life, emerge from the four obscure but powerful poems entitled "Feelings". *Ibid.*, 484. The complexity of the allusions in them discourages an attempt at translation.

<sup>4</sup> T'an Ssu-t'ung, *Jen hsueh* (Shanghai: Chung-hua, 1958), 2.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 3. *T'an Ssu-t'ung ch'uan chi*, 4, omits the world's religions.

<sup>6</sup> T'an, *Jen hsueh*, 11-2.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 24.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 46.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 58.



<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 59.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 76.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 61.

<sup>13</sup> Yang Jung-kuo, *T'an Ssu-t'ung che-hsueh ssu-hsiang* (Peking: Jen-min, 1957), chapter 2, is an attempt, from the point of view of Chinese communist orthodoxy, to claim T'an in principle for the "materialist" camp, while indicating the inconsistencies and inadequacies of his position from this point of view.

<sup>14</sup> T'an, *Jen hsueh*, 7-8.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 60-1.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 18-9.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 13-4.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 24. The passage in question reads: "Ritual depends on altruism to shine forth. If there is altruism, then ritual arises of itself, without waiting for the separate creation of [categorizing] designations to force it into shape. The same is true of moral norms and of 'closeness and remoteness'. They exist naturally. It is not necessary, in a spirit of severity, to set up gradations of respect wherewith to control them with a scrupulous rigour. Both ritual and moral norms have their source in altruism; but if taken to extremes they may result in a great violation of altruism, for grave hurt is caused by being so trapped in the mud of the bodily soul." This is a subtle iconoclasm, in which the traditional ideals of altruism and nature are used to subvert the prescriptive force of the traditional ideals of ritual and conventional morality.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 29-30.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 66.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 39.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 73-4.

<sup>31</sup> W.J. Duiker, "The aesthetics philosophy of Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei," *Philosophy East and West* XXII.iv (Oct 1972), 391-2.

<sup>32</sup> K'ang Yu-wei and K'ang Wen-p'ei, *K'ang Nan-hai tzu-ting nien-p'u*, *K'ang Nan-hai hsien-sheng nien-p'u hsu-pien* (Taipei: Wen-hai, 1972), 10.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 10-1.

<sup>34</sup> K'ang Yu-wei, *Ta t'ung shu* (Peking: Ku-chi, 1956), 2. The translation is that of L. Thompson, *Ta T'ung Shu. The One-World Philosophy of K'ang Yu-wei* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1958), 63. The rendering of *ta t'ung* as 'great uniformity' in the present text is a lexically defensible break with the more usual 'grand unity', 'universal concord', etc., made in order to emphasize the distinctive character of K'ang's conception.

<sup>35</sup> K'ang, *Ta t'ung shu*, 293.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, sections *i*, *ping*, *ting*.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, section *wu*.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 190.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 190 and 216.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 284.



<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 288-90.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 264-6.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 271-8.

<sup>44</sup> Thompson, *op. cit.*; R.C. Howard, "K'ang Yu-wei: his intellectual background and early thought," in A.F. Wright and D. Twitchett, ed., *Confucian Personalities* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962); J.P. Lo, ed., *K'ang Yu-wei: a biography and a symposium* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1967); and S.L. Tikhvinskii, trans. Chang Shih-yü *et al.*, *Chung-kuo pien-fa wei-hsin yun-tung ho K'ang Yu-wei* (Peking: San-lien, 1959), of which ch. 14 deals with the *Ta t'ung shu*. (Russian original: *Dvizhenie za reformi v Kitae v kontse XIX veka i Kan Yu-wei* (Moscow: Izdatelstvo vostochnoi literatury, 1959)).

<sup>45</sup> K'ang, *Ta t'ung shu*, 136.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 136.

<sup>47</sup> Feng Yu-lan, *Hsin yuan jen* (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1946 reprint of 1943 edition), 37.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 75-9.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 33. Compare page 89.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 90.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 96.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 96.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 18.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, 99-100.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 138, 141, and 143.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 104.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 121.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, 84. Compare page 27.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 84.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 52.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 132.

<sup>63</sup> At least the equation seems implied by *ibid.*, 92. The oversimplification in the text arises mainly from the neglect of Feng's theory that the freedom of the will increases as a man moves from the realm of Utility to that of Morality, where he is selfless but self-determining. *Ibid.*, 82-3. The full quotation from Schiller is:

In der Herzens heilig stille Räume  
Musst Du fliehen aus des Lebens drang  
Freiheit ist nur in dem Reich der Träume  
Und das Schöne blüht nur im Gesang.

(Quoted in K. Pinson, *Modern Germany. Its History and Civilization* (New York: MacMillan, 1954), 20.)

<sup>64</sup> Quoted in D. W. Y. Kwok, *Scientism in Chinese Thought* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), 103-4.

<sup>65</sup> *Hu Shih wen hs'uan* (Hong Kong: Hsien-tai, 1956), 1, 7 and 66-8.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 1, 7.

<sup>67</sup> Chang Tung-sun, *Hsin che-hsueh lun ts'ung* (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1929), 425.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, 22, 40 and 42.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, 44.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, 49.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 52.



<sup>72</sup> Chang Tung-sun, *Tao-te che-hsueh* (Shanghai: Chung-hua, 1931 (title-page says "1930")), 589-1.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, 566-8.

<sup>74</sup> Chang, *Hsin che-hsueh*, 54.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 456.

<sup>76</sup> Chang, *Tao-te*, 583.

<sup>77</sup> Chang, *Hsin che-hsueh*, 449 *et seq.*, esp. 463.

<sup>78</sup> Chang, *Tao-te*, 560 and 578-9.

<sup>79</sup> Chang, *Hsin che-hsueh*, 49-50; Chang, *Tao-te*, 579.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, 587.

<sup>81</sup> Chang, *Hsin che-hsueh*, 63.

<sup>82</sup> Chang, *Tao-te*, 614-5.

<sup>83</sup> Chang, *Hsin che-hsueh*, 64.

<sup>84</sup> D.T. Roy, *Kuo Mo-jo: the Early Years* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 87.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, 90.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, 155.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, 160.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, 165-6.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, 135.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, 148 and 153-4.

<sup>91</sup> Ai Ssu-ch'i, *Ta chung che-hsueh* (N.p.: Hsin-hua, 1949), 125-6.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, 57. On selflessness as the prerequisite for accurate knowledge see also pages 78-9.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 202.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, 47.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, 47.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, 125.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, 88-9 and 95.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, 88.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, 99-100, 137, 148 and 150.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, 89-91.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, 79.

<sup>102</sup> F. Wakeman, *History and Will. Philosophical Perspectives of Mao Tse-tung's Thought* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 115-6, 123 and 135.

<sup>103</sup> O. Brière, *Fifty Years of Chinese Philosophy, 1898-1948* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1956), *passim*.



## THE GEORGE ERNEST MORRISON LECTURE IN ETHNOLOGY

The George Ernest Morrison Lecture was founded by Chinese residents in Australia and others in honour of the late Dr G.E. Morrison, a native of Geelong, Victoria, Australia.

The objects of the foundation of the lectureship were to honour for all time the memory of a great Australian who rendered valuable services to China, and to improve cultural relations between China and Australia. The foundation of the lectureship had the official support of the Chinese Consulate-General, and was due in particular to the efforts of Mr William Liu, merchant, of Sydney; Mr William Ah Ket, barrister, of Melbourne; Mr F.J. Quinlan and Sir Colin MacKenzie, of Canberra. From the time of its inception until 1948 the lecture was associated with the Australian Institute of Anatomy, but in the latter year the responsibility for the management of the lectureship was taken over by the Australian National University, and the lectures delivered since that date have been given under the auspices of the University.

*The following lectures have been delivered:*

- Inaugural: W.P. Chen, *The Objects of the Foundation of the Lectureship and a review of Dr Morrison's Life in China.* 10 May 1932.
- Second: W. Ah Ket, *Eastern Thought, with More Particular Reference to Confucius.* 3 May 1933.
- Third: J.S. MacDonald, *The History and Development of Chinese Art.* 3 May 1934.
- Fourth: W.P. Chen, *The New Culture Movement in China.* 10 May 1935.
- Fifth: Wu Lien-teh, *Reminiscences of George E. Morrison; and Chinese Abroad.* 2 September 1936.
- Sixth: Chun-jien Pae, *China Today: With Special Reference to Higher Education.* 4 May 1937.
- Seventh: A.F. Barker, *The Impact of Western Industrialism on China.* 17 May 1938.
- Eighth: S.H. Roberts, *The Gifts of the Old China to the New.* 5 June 1939.
- Ninth: Howard Mowll, *West China as Seen Through the Eyes of the Westerner.* 29 May 1949.

- Tenth: W.G. Goddard, *The Ming Shen. A Study in Chinese Democracy*. 5 June 1941.
- Eleventh: D.B. Copland, *The Chinese Social Structure*. 27 September 1948.\*
- Twelfth: J.K. Rideout, *Politics in Medieval China*. 28 October 1949.
- Thirteenth: C.P. Fitzgerald, *The Revolutionary Tradition in China*. 19 March 1951.
- Fourteenth: H.V. Evatt, *Some Aspects of Morrison's Life and Work*. 4 December 1952.
- Fifteenth: Lord Lindsay of Birker, *China and the West*. 20 October 1953.
- Sixteenth: M. Titiev, *Chinese Elements in Japanese Culture*. 27 July 1954.
- Seventeenth: H. Bielenstein, *Emperor Kuang-Wu (A.D.25-27) and the Northern Barbarians*. 2 November 1955.\*
- Eighteenth: Leonard B. Cox, *The Buddhist Temples of Yun-Kang and Lung-Men*. 17 October 1956.\*
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